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Models of Corporate Conduct:
From the Government Dominated
Corporation to the Corporate
Dominated Government
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1932 there has been scholarly discussion concerning the
proper role of the private corporation in society and specifically
whether or not the private business entity has social responsibili-
ties.' In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in
this issue with a number of commentators presenting divergent
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. BA. 1969, J.D. 1972,
Columbia University.
** B A. 1975, Harvard University; J.D. 1978, University of Nebraska.
1. E.g., R BARBER, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (1970); A. BERLE & G. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); N. JACOBY, CORPo-
RATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILTrY (1973); THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE
AMERIcA: THE CORPORATE ISSUES SOURCEBOOK (M. Johnson ed. 1978); T. LEV-
ITT, THE THIRD SECTOR, NEW TACTICS FOR A RESPONSIVE SOCIETY (1973); C.
LINDBLOM, PoLrrTcs AND MARKETS (1977); THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCI-
ETY (E. Mason ed. 1959); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE
MODERN CORPORATION (1976); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975); Berle,
Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L REV. 433 (1962);
Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L REV. 408 (1962); Cof-
fee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); Con-
ard, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941 (1977); Dodd,
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932);
Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corpo-
rate Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248 (1969); Latty, Why Are Business Cor-
poration Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965); Manne, The
"Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L REV. 399 (1962);
Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis
and Particular Reservations, 55 Nw. U.L REV. 38 (1960); Soderquist &
Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders'Rights and Corporate Responsibility: New
Guidelines for Management, 1978 DUKE L.J. 819; Symposium-Reweaving the
Corporate Veil, 41 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB., Summer, 1977; Wright, The Modern
Corporation-Twenty Years After, 19 U. Cm. L. REV. 662 (1952); Note, The
Modern Corporation Looks Homeward-The Berle & Means Revolution and
the Corporate Paradigm, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 471.
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views. 2 A comparison of the early commentators with those of the
present day shows similar concerns but differences in emphasis
because of changing times.3 More importantly, the disagreement
among the scholars can best be explained and understood by first
examining the perspectives from which they launch their attack.
If the matter is viewed purely as a question of the shareholder's
proprietary interest in the corporation, one result will of course be
dictated. Casting the issue in terms of the best interest of society
will obviously lead to a different resolution. The various interests
which must be considered in analyzing the effect and proper role
of the modern business corporation are numerous. The interests
of the shareholder are two-fold, and these interests can either
coexist or exist as alternatives. First, the shareholder has a propri-
etary or ownership interest in the business, which may well in-
clude a desire for active participation in management; second, the
shareholder has an investor interest which involves a desire for
capital appreciation or income based on a more passive invest-
ment.4 A second interest group to be considered is the business
employees; at issue here is the extent to which corporate decision-
making should consider their particular problems. A third area of
concern intrinsic to the corporate arena is that of the corporation
as a distinct entity involving a combination of all of the various
interests.
External to the corporate structure are other interests which
must be considered. Business customers-whether they be other
corporate entities or members of the general consuming pub-
lic-require corporate management to consider such areas as prod-
uct safety and other consumer-oriented matters. Depending, of
course, on the size of the corporation, all of society is at least col-
laterally affected by corporate conduct. The fact that the largest
2. One commentator has attempted to break down current analysis into nine
species of corporate reform: (1) widespread governmental involvement in the
decisionmaking process of large corporations; (2) governmental regulation
and taxation of corporate conduct; (3) basic recognition of a free enterprise
system with governmental control in certain limited areas of corporate con-
duct; (4) protection of small business through the antitrust laws and Small
Business Administration; (5) increased disclosure to protect investors; (6)
increased shareholder democracy; (7) "minoritarianism"-protecting the mi-
nority shareholder against oppression by the majority; (8) all corporate deci-
sions must be arrived at by a consensus of all individuals affected by the
outcome; and (9) ensuring management accountability. Manning, Thinking
Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer,
1977, at 3. See note 1 supra.
3. See Note, The Modem Corporation Looks Homeward. The Berle & Means
Revolution and the Corporate Paradigm, 1975 UTAH L REV. 471.
4. See Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder
Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis.
L REV. 391.
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public issue companies have more wealth than the majority of the
world's nations is clear evidence of their impact on American soci-
ety as a whole. In addition to the expansive effects of the large
corporation, the by-products of doing business, such as environ-
mental pollution, will directly affect members of the community
who have no other relationship to the business enterprise than
physical proximity. Accordingly, much that has been said will also
apply-albeit on a smaller scale-to medium sized and closely held
entities.
In one way or another all of the foregoing interests have to be
considered when examining the proper role of a corporation. In
analyzing each of the major proposals for corporate reform, it is
necessary to keep in mind the bias of the proposers and identify
the interest group to which they are most sympathetic. The
method of implementation as well as the general substance of the
proposal or regulation suggested must be examined.
Corporate chartering statutes are concerned with protecting
the interests of the shareholder-proprietor. Federal and state se-
curities legislation is directed toward protecting the interests of
the shareholder-investor. However, it may be necessary to look
beyond these methods of controlling corporate management in or-
der to place the regulation of the corporation in proper perspec-
tive. For example, there are independent regulatory schemes for
labor,5 environmental impact,6 undue participation in the political
process, 7 and preservation of the free enterprise system through
the breaking up of monopolies and contracts in restraint of trade.8
Additionally, some industries have been viewed as requiring even
more specialized regulation-for example banks,9 investment com-
panies,' 0 public utilities," communications,12 railroads, 13 ship-
ping,14 and airlines, 15 as well as various other so-called regulated
industries.16
This article will examine the views of selected corporate com-
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 1381 (1976).
6. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371 to 4374 (1976).
7. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 to 455 (1976); 28 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 32 (1976).
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 522 (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976).
12. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 744 (1970).
13. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 669 (1970); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 300 (1970).
14. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 1413 (1970); 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 to 327, 901 to 1000 (1970).
15. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 to 1542 (1970).
16. See generally D. BoEs & P. VERKUni, PuBLIc CONTROL OF BusINEss: CASES
AND MATERIALS (1977); W. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS (2d ed. 1976); T. MORGAN, ECONOMIc REGULATION OF BUSINESS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1976).
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mentators concerning the proper scope, function and structure of
corporate regulation, with emphasis on the interests to be pro-
tected by each. Examination of the individual proposals is a neces-
sary prerequisite to answering the more overriding question of
whether there should be one unitary system of regulation as op-
posed to the motley system that now exists.
11. THE PROBLEM DEFINED
The charge has been made that many of the prototypical public
issue corporations have grown too big and too powerful. They fre-
quently intrude into the private lives of individuals and con-
sciously as well as inadvertently meddle with foreign policy. As
bastions of modern technology, they are able to indulge them-
selves and portions of the public in luxuries at the expense of the
environment and natural resources. The argument is that the
large publicly held corporations are so entrenched in society that
they should be responsible to it in more than merely an economic
sense.
The demand that corporate activities should be determined not
solely by the profit motive, but by the public interest as well, is not
a new one. Corporations have always been expected to perform
some sort of public function. However, only since the 1930's has
legal scholarship placed a particular emphasis on the social,
noneconomic role of corporations in society.I7
The process of implementing affirmative social duties for mod-
ern corporations has not been a speedy one. Professor Edward S.
Mason has identified one of the primary reasons for this lethargy:
"[T]he business corporation is so much our most important eco-
nomic institution and it is so thoroughly integrated into our busi-
ness culture that to suggest a drastic change in the scope or
character of corporate activity is to suggest a drastic alteration in
the structure of society."'18 According to Professor Mason, corpora-
tions obtained their current position in society as a result of the
industrial revolution and the society's desire for economic
growth.19 As the corporate sphere of influence increased, the pub-
lic rapidly adapted to the fact that the forces of supply and demand
were kept artificially in check by large, market-dominating corpo-
rations. This type of artificial stability appeared to have been
17. See notes 1-2 supra.
18. Mason, Introduction to THE CORPORATION N MODERN SocIETY 1 (E. Mason
ed. 1959). Mason recognizes the necessity of the corporate form to meet capi-
tal, technological and managerial needs. Yet, the result is that the modem
corporation permeates extensively our culture, and an attempt to change it
will necessarily alter many elements of society.
19. Id.
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brought about with no apparent need for effective controls. Con-
currently, the consuming public's dependence on large corpora-
tions was perfected. Against this background, there has been a
natural political, economic, and social reluctance that has delayed
any monumental corporate reform.20
John Kenneth Galbraith has suggested that society is merely
entertaining a myth to avoid dealing with corporate responsibility
problems:
The myth that holds that the great corporation is the puppet of the mar-
ket, the powerless servant of the consumer, is, in fact, one of the devices
by which its power is perpetuated. Colonialism, we saw, was possible only
because the myth of higher moral purpose regularly concealed the realty
of lower economic interest. Similarly here. Were it part of our everyday
education and comment that the corporation is an instrument for the exer-
cise of power, that it belongs to the process by which we are governed,
there would then be debate on how that power is used and how it might be
made subordinate to the public will and need. This debate is avoided by
propagating the myth that the power does not exist. It is especially useful
that the young be so instructed. By pretending that power is not present,
we greatly reduce the need to worry about its exercise.
2 1
Of course, there are other explanations for the failure to depart
from the status quo and to redefine the corporation's role in soci-
ety, the primary one being the divergence of views on the proper
corporate role.22
As Mason further points out, there is no consensus as to how
the problem of corporate responsibility ought to be solved. A
"cacophony of voices" speaks of "new feudalism" and "self-perpet-
uating oligarchies," and at the same time of "professionalism of
management," and "beneficence of the 'corporate conscience.' "23
Legislators, courts and the public are left with no clear view as to
how to go about solving this national dilemma.24
The first view which will be considered is that of Professors
Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, as elaborated upon in
their seminal work. 25 These authors adopted a social scientist's
abstract and philosophical approach to the issue. Less concerned
with the mechanics for gaining control of the corporate giants in
modern society, Berle and Means traced the deterioration of share-
holder rights and, in their view, the consequent inapplicability of
traditional notions of private property. These developments, said
Berle and Means, led the way to rearrangement of corporate re-
20. Id. at 1-4.
21. J.K. GALsRArrx, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 258-59 (1977).
22. See note 2 & accompanying text supra.
23. Mason, supra note 18, at 2.
24. Id.
25. See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
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sponsibilities. Rather than suggest a systematic overhaul of the
corporate superstructure, they preferred to wait until viable "rear-
rangements" had been suggested before scrapping the traditional
role of corporations in society.26 The contemporaneous view of
Professor E. Merrick Dodd provides an alternative to the Berle and
Means paradigm. 27 Dodd asserted that corporate managers owed a
duty not only to shareholders but to other rectors of society as
well.28
An extension of Dodd's view is exemplified by the writings of
consumer advocate Ralph Nader and his co-authors, Mark Green
and Joel Seligman.29 Essentially, they urge extensive legislative
reforms to regain state control over corporations, and to direct cor-
porate activities. An interesting counterpart of the Nader ap-
proach is found in the works of Christopher Stone which delineate
an internal structural approach to corporate reform.30 These pro-
ponents of corporate reform do not hesitate to subordinate the
profit motive to the public interest. For those who favor corporate
assumptions of social obligations, the comprehensive proposals of
the Nader group and Professor Stone reveal several methods by
which corporations might be made more responsible to the public.
Another major view is that of Theodore Levitt,31 professor at
the Harvard Business School. The essence of Levitt's position is
that corporations should not be coerced to assume social responsi-
bilities. He foresees dangers under such a coercive scheme. The
corporate role in society is, and should be according to Levitt a nar-
row one. He suggests that private enterprise is properly commit-
ted to the profit motive and that other sources may be tapped for
solving the more grandiose societal problems.
A fourth view of corporate responsibility emerges from the writ-
ings of the free-market economist Henry Manne.32 Professor
26. Id. at 356. See also Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45
HArv. L REV. 1365, 1368 (1932).
27. E.g., Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REa.
1145 (1932). See text accompanying notes 61-68 infra. See also Weiner, The
Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 CoLum. L. REV.
1458 (1964).
28. Id.
29. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GLxrr CORPORATION (1976).
See Oldham, Book Review, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 335 (1978).
30. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDs (1975). For a similar approach, see Coffee,
Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Mis-
conduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977). See text
accompanying notes 96-105 infra. See also Cohen, Book Review, 62 VA. L.
REV. 259 (1976).
31. See Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsibility, 36 HARV. Bus. REV., Oct.,
1958, at 41 [hereinafter cited as Dangers].
32. See Manne, Should Corporations Assume More Social Responsibility?, in THa
19781
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Manne, following the lead of pure laissez-faire economics, would
allow the profit motive and the striving for efficiency to stand as
the primary control against corporate misconduct. Manne's philos-
ophy of corporate self-governance is much more optimistic than
that of Professor Levitt, and would equally preclude the public sec-
tor's taking care of social needs.33
These four basic approaches each have their acolytes and have
set the stage for much embellishment. After discussing these
views, this article will extract the benefits from each to frame a
suggested approach for possible legal reform in the regulation of
the large, publicly held corporation.
III. BERLE AND MEANS
A. The Initial Recognition of the Need for Redefinition
In 1932, Berle and Means explained:
[A] society in which production is governed by blind economic forces is
being replaced by one in which production is carried on under the ulti-
mate control of a handful of individuals. The economic power in the hands
of the few persons who control a giant corporation is a tremendous force
which can harm or benefit a multitude of individuals, affect whole dis-
tricts, shift the currents of trade, bring ruin to one community and pros-
perity to another. The organizations which they control have passed far
beyond the realm of private enterprise-they have become more nearly
social institutions. 3 4
The authors, lawyer and economist, teamed up in 1930 to study this
awesome corporate system. Their findings were published in
1932,35 and they have since been credited with initiating the intel-
lectual revolution in the theory of corporate behavior.3 6
Berle and Means attempted to explain the changes that had oc-
curred in the philosophical underpinnings of the corporation in so-
ciety. They focused not on reform nor adjustment of the corporate
role in modem society, but on the traditional economic and prop-
erty doctrines that they posited were no longer applicable to the
corporate system. They maintained that the abandonment of
these old doctrines removed restraints on corporate activity that in
the past required corporations to act exclusively in the interest of
shareholders.3 7 After stating the problem, Berle and Means pro-
posed a new framework for analysis, which they asserted would
ATTACK ON CORPORATE AmEInCA: THE CORPORATE ISSUES SOURCEBOOK 3 (M.
Johnson ed. 1978); Manne, The "Higher Criticism" ofthe Modern Corporation,
62 CoLum. L REV. 399 (1962) [hereinafter cited as The "Higher Criticism"].
33. See text accompanying notes 157-72 infra.
34. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 25, at 46 (footnote omitted).
35. A. BERE & G. MEANS, supra note 25.
36. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 18, at 3; Note, supra note 3, at 477.
37. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 25, at 4-7.
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better enable the corporation to serve the interests of society as a
whole.38
Surprisingly, however, Berle and Means did not urge a radical
change in the corporate purpose, even though the opportunity to
make corporations more socially oriented existed and was seized
upon by later commentators. 39 The Berle and Means paradigm
was based upon a legal theory that attempted to keep corporations
operating in the same basic manner they had previously while pro-
moting recognition of the corporation as a socially oriented institu-
tion.4° Berle and Means were reluctant to enlarge the role of
business as evidenced by their refusal to encourage the expansion
of the corporate purpose beyond its traditional economic function
in society.
This initial attack on the existing corporate system provides an
excellent introduction to the current debate over corporate social
responsibility. Berle and Means' conclusions have been consid-
ered important scholarly breakthroughs. 41 Yet, in contrast to
those of modern reformers, Berle and Means' proposals were quite
modest, for they concluded that the corporation's social responsi-
bilities extended only so far as its business purposes would natu-
rally require.
Berle and Means began by expressing their alarm with the in-
creasing concentration of power in the hands of management and
by tracing the causes for this development. Since the mid-nine-
teenth century, state corporation statutes had been increasingly
liberalized to give management more flexibility and power. For ex-
ample, shareholders had lost power to nominate and remove direc-
tors without cause,4 2 the states had relaxed the requirement that
contributions to capital be made in cash,43 mandatory pre-emptive
rights had been lost,4 4 certain restrictions on payment of dividends
had been eliminated,45 and the states had granted additional au-
thority to management to change the terms of stock contracts.4 6 It
is significant that these changes were not brought about by any
public outcry for efficiency, but rather to promote the design of leg-
islators to have firms incorporate in their states, thus providing ad-
38. Id. at 7-8.
39. E.g., Blumberg, Politicalization of the Corporation, 51 B.U. L REV. 425 (1971);
Dodd, supra note 27; Miller, Toward the "Techno-Corporate" State?-An Es-
say in American Constitutionalism, 14 Vnr. L REv. 1 (1968).
40. See text accompanying notes 59-60 infra.
41. A. BERIE & G. MEANs, supra note 25, at 139.
42. Id. at 139-40.
43. Id. at 141-44.
44. Id. at 144-46.
45. Id. at 146-48.
46. Id. at 148-51.
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ditional revenue. 47
A second explanation offered for increasing management power
was corporate growth, which expanded the corporation's bureau-
cratic structure and necessarily the number of employees under
management control.48 Berle and Means also found corporate
growth to be accompanied by increasing dispersion of stock owner-
ship. As the number of shareholders grew, it became more difficult
for any non-management shareholders to exert significant control
over corporate actions. Consequently, more power was lodged in
corporate management as shareholders became less able to con-
trol its actions and command its accountability.49
Berle and Means devoted most of their attention to this third
explanation for increased management authority. They specu-
lated that the dispersion of stock ownership and the resultant loss
of ownership control would have an increasingly greater effect on
the traditional theories of property underlying our economic sys-
tern:
Outwardly the change is simple enough. Men are less likely to own the
physical instruments of production. They are more likely to own pieces of
paper .... Beneath this, however, lies a more fundamental shift. Physi-
cal control over the instruments of production has been surrendered in
ever growing degree to centralized groups .... Power over industrial
property has been cut off from the beneficial ownership of this prop-
erty--or, in less technical language, from the legal right to enjoy its fruits.
. . . We see, in fact, the surrender and regrouping of the incidence of own-
ership, which formerly bracketed full power of manual disposition with
complete right to enjoy the use, the fruits, and the proceeds of physical
assets. There has resulted the dissolution of the old atom of ownership
into its component parts, control and beneficial ownership 5 0
The logical extension of this dichotomy was more recently identi-
fied and supported by Bayless Manning, who suggested that, at
least in the large corporate entity, shareholders be denied all vot-
ing rights.51
A concomitant development under Berle and Means' analysis
47. See Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); R. NA-
DER, M. GREEN & J. SEUGMAN, supra note 29, at 43-61; Cary, Federalism & Cor-
porate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
48. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 25, at 3.
49. Id. at 3-5.
50. Id. at 7-8.
51. Manning, supra note 2, at 15. See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477,
1490 (1958):
Assume a large modern corporation similar to its typical commercial
counterpart in all respects but two. First, the model abandons the a
priori legal conclusion that the shareholders "own the corporation"
and substitutes the more restricted conception that the only thing
they "own" is their shares of stock. Second, the shareholder in this
model corporation has no voting rights. His position would be quite
similar to that of a voting trust certificate-holder with all economic
[VOL. 58:100
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was that management, no longer restrained by shareholder con-
trol, would not be bound to its traditional duty to make profits. De-
spite eliminating natural controls against self dealing and
corporate waste, this shift left room for redirecting corporate obli-
gations to the public through the abandonment of the profit mo-
tive:
There is no longer any certainty that a corporation will in fact be run pri-
marily in the interests of the stockholders. The extensive separation of
ownership and control, and the strengthening of the powers of control,
raise a new situation calling for a decision whether social and legal pres-
sure should be applied in an effort to insure corporate operation primarily
in the interests of the "owners" or whether such pressure shall be applied
in the interests of some other or wider group.
5 2
Unlike some of the later commentators, Berle and Means never
went so far as to conclude that corporations should be governed by
public interests since management was no longer limited by the
profit motive.53 They instead were preoccupied with the share-
holder's proprietary interest.
By focusing on the shareholder's interest as an owner rather
than as merely a passive investor, Berle and Means reached the
conclusion that shareholders have a legitimate interest in the com-
pany which exceeds the mere dollar value of their interest. Cer-
tainly, in the closely-held concern it is likely that the shareholder
will demand an active role in day-to-day operations or a check
upon independent management. This proximity between the
shareholder and the business creates strong ties. Accordingly,
rights in the deposited stock but no power to elect or replace the
trustees by vote.
But see, e.g., Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Re-
flections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L REV. 1 (1970).
This is an extreme extension of recognizing the shareholder qua investor as
opposed to qua proprietor. This investor oriented perspective is more per-
suasive within the context of the public issue corporation than of the closely-
held concern.
See also, e.g., P. DRUcKER, THE NEW SociETY 340 (1950); J. LIVINGSTON, THE
AmERIcAN STOCKHOLDER 68-80 (1958); Chayes, The Modern Corporation and
the Rule ofLaw, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIETY 25,40-41 (E. Mason
ed. 1959); The "Higher Criticism," supra note 32, at 407-13.
52. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 25, at 333 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 356-57. While recognizing that the way has been cleared to look after
the interests of "a group far wider than either the owners or control," they
nevertheless qualify their remarks: "It remains only for the claims of the
community to be put forward with clarity and force.... When a convincing
system of community obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in
that moment the passive property right of today must yield before the larger
interest of society." Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
In 1968, Berle's view of corporate social obligations remained a narrow
one. See Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 Bus. LAw.
149 (1968).
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there has long been a recognition of special statutory norms5 4 and
other control devices55 to assist the shareholder of the closely-held
concern in sharing control with management. Involvement in the
closely-held corporation often extends beyond pure economic in-
terest and includes emotional attachments, such as those center-
ing around a family business. These emotional attachments need
not be protected within the context of the larger corporation.
In contrast to the closely-held concern, the shareholder's voice
in a large public issue corporation falls upon the deaf ears of man-
agement. In the first instance, this is explainable purely on the ba-
sis of the proportionately insignificant vote of any shareholder or
group of shareholders. Accordingly, it has been proposed that this
"fact of life" be recognized by abolishing the shareholder vote.5 6 It
has also been suggested that the divorce of ownership from control
and the advent of management control have eliminated the goal of
corporate profitability as a primary motive. Since traditional
fiduciary standards are ineffective, the unchecked management
looks out for its own interests, perhaps even to the extent of loot-
ing the corporation.57
In light of the fact that actual practice did not bear out the the-
ory that the profit motive had been discarded, Berle and Means
searched out a rule that would explain its continued use. They
found that in spite of increasing management powers, "it is clear
that these powers are not absolute. They are, rather powers in
trust. The controlling group is, in form at least, managing and con-
trolling a corporation for the benefit of the owners. ' '58 The powers
in trust theory59 placed a legal restriction on management's ulti-
54. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 342-356 (1972). For cases developing special
rules for closely-held concerns under the general corporate chartering stat-
utes, see, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505
(1975). (recognizing a partnership-like high fiduciary duty running between
the shareholders); Galler v. Galler, 32111. 2d 16,203 N.E.2d 577 (1965) (uphold-
ing narrowly drawn voting agreement); E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert,
157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954) (same).
55. See generally F. ONEAL, CLOSE CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1971).
56. See note 50 supra.
57. See Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL LQ. 628
(1965). See also Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GEo. L.J. 543
(1965); Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate
Control, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 259 (1966); Hazen, Transfers of Corporate Control
and Duties of Controlling Shareholders--Common Law, Tender Offers, Invest-
ment Companies-and a Proposalfor Reform, 125 U. PA. L REV. 1023 (1977);
Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L REV. 986 (1957).
58. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 25, at 335.
59. The theory had been substantiated by Professor Berle in 1931. See Berle,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). An ex-
pansion of the strict trust theory can be found in the writings of Professor
[VOL. 58:100
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mate abandonment of the profit motive. It would protect share-
holder interests until the law placed corporate responsibility in the
hands of some other group. Finally, the concept of such a trustee-
ship laid the burden for making corporations socially responsible
on the shareholders.
Thus, in The Modern Corporation, Berle and Means had identi-
fied what they believed to be fundamental changes in the tradi-
tional theory of property ownership.60 They had recognized the
increased power of corporate management and consequent vulner-
ability of shareholders and the public to corporate actions. Yet,
their recommendation to control powerful management followed
the traditional method of relying on shareholders to express their
concerns and oversee corporate operations.
B. Berle-Dodd Debate
Professor Berle encountered resistance to his powers in trust
theory from E. Merrick Dodd, a Harvard law professor.61 Dodd be-
lieved that corporate managers held powers in trust not only for
shareholders, but for other groups affected by corporations as well.
These groups included suppliers, employees and customers. Dodd
viewed Berle as trying to protect shareholders from self-interested
management by emphasizing the profit motive.62 According to
Dodd this was unnecessary and unfortunate, in light of public de-
mands for corporate responsibility.63 He further contended that
the doctrine of maximizing profits for shareholder benefit would
have to be modified if society ever hoped to meet its goals of as-
sured production and employment for its members.64 Self-inter-
ested shareholders could hardly be expected to pursue society's
objectives. Thus according to Dodd, management would have to be
relied upon to meet public demands. The profit motive would have
to be subordinated to what he viewed as greater societal needs.65
Berle responded that Dodd's contentions might be correct in
David Bayne. See, e.g., Bayne, supra note 57; Bayne, A Philosophy of Corpo-
rate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22 (1963).
60. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 25, at 345-51.
61. Dodd, supra note 27. See Weiner, supra note 27.
62. Dodd, supra note 27, at 1146-48.
63. Id. at 1148:
[Berle] believes public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has
made and is today making substantial strides in the direction of a
view of the business corporation as an economic institution which
has a social service as well as a profit-making function, that this view
has already had some effect upon legal theory, and that it is likely to
have a greatly increased effect upon the latter in the future.
64. Id. at 1152.
65. Id. at 1153.
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theory, but certainly not in practice. 66 He maintained that the
profit motive still controlled corporate actions and that the law had
recognized no other responsibility of corporate managers, except
to shareholders.67 Moreover, no viable alternative yet existed:
"[Y] ou can not abandon emphasis on 'the view that business cor-
porations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their
stockholders' until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear
and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone
else., 68
Years later Berle relented. 69 The reason was the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v.
Barlow.70 The court there held that corporate directors could le-
gitimately donate corporate funds to a private university.71 With
this development, Berle realized that corporate management was
no longer restricted to profit maximization by virtue of legal limita-
tion. Management now had court approval to pursue non-profit ac-
tivities. Berle conceded this portion of the debate to Dodd, and
admitted that corporate management had been forced into a social
statesmanship role by public demand.72
66. Berle, supra note 26, at 1367.
67. Id.
68. Id. Berle found sufficient public interest in the millions of individuals who
depend upon investment income to justify protection of their interests via the
current system of individual ownership of property. Until an alternative sys-
tem is designed, it would be unimaginable to turn over the "economic power
now mobilized and massed under corporate form ... weakly to the present
administrators with a pious wish that something nice will come out of it all."
Id. at 1368.
69. A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPrrALIST REVOLUTION (1954). See also Berle,
supra note 53, at 150-51; Note, The Shareholder's Role in Corporate Social
Responsibility, 5 U. MIcH. J.L REF. 68, 70 n.ll (1971).
70. 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal denied, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
71. After concluding that the corporation has always had an obligation as a re-
sponsible member of society, the court validated the gift. It noted that in ad-
dition to corporate beneficence, by supporting private education the directors
were furthering the economic interests of the corporation. 13 N.J. at 149-55,
160-61, 98 A.2d at 583-88, 590. The Barlow holding has since been codified.
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(m) (1969).
See also Armstrong Cork Co. v. HA. Neldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y.
1922); Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970); Theodora Holding Co.
v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); State ex rel. Sorensen v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R., 112 Neb. 248, 199 N.W. 534 (1924); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17
Misc. 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1896). For earlier cases, see generally F. AN-
DREwS, CORPORATE GIVING (1952); Cousens, How Far Corporations May Con-
tribute to Charity, 35 VA. L. REV. 401 (1949).
Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down a state
statute barring corporate expenditures for influencing voters on public refer-
enda that would affect the corporate enterprise).
72. Berle, supra note 26; Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62
COLuM. L. REV. 433 (1962); Note, supra note 69, at 69-71.
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In sum, it appears that Berle and Means only went so far. In
The Modern Corporation they proclaimed the changing relation-
ship of individuals to property brought about by development of
the modem corporate system. They went no further because soci-
ety had not yet developed a consensus on corporate social obliga-
tions. In theory, shareholder relinquishment of control over
corporate property should have allowed management to pursue
nonprofit goals. In practice, however, this did not occur. The rea-
son, claimed Berle, was that under the present legal system corpo-
rate managers held their powers as trustees for shareholders
interests which necessarily defined the profit motive as the pri-
mary, albeit not the exclusive, goal.
Under the Berle-Dodd dichotomy reformers are faced with two
alternative frameworks if corporate social responsibility is truly
desirable. The first is to put the burden of enforcing social respon-
sibility on shareholders. This alternative is favored in The Modern
Corporation, and appears to be the point with which the book con-
cludes.
The second alternative is the Dodd approach of requiring by
law that corporate managers tend to the interests of other mem-
bers of the public besides shareholders. In effect, this would fur-
nish legal acknowledgement of noneconomic corporate
responsibilities to society, in contrast to the narrower powers in
trust approach. In the end it would force subordination of the
profit motive to broader public interests.
Throughout The Modern Corporation and his debate with Dodd,
Berle clung stubbornly to the profit motive theory, reluctant to let
it go until a viable alternative was presented. Berle was in fear of
management's abuse of power and he hoped that society would ar-
rive at a carefully designed replacement before management itself
abandoned maximization of shareholder profit to further social
welfare goals of its own determination. As time passed, however,
Dodd's more expansive view of corporate responsibility continued
to gain acceptance7 3 and Berle had to respond to these develop-
ments.
In 1968, Professor Berle elaborated on the development of cor-
porate responsibilities as a matter of "inchoate law."74 He ex-
plained:
[T]he law affecting corporations falls in two categories. The first is famil-
iar... -- the explicit rules laid down by decision or statute and setting out
the existing legal capacities and liabilities. The second, more important
and more difficult category, we call "inchoate" law. This relates to the du-
73. See J.W. HURST, THE LEGrrimAcY OF THE BusINEss Col.ORATmoN iN THE LAw
OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970).
74. Berle, supra note 53, at 149.
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ties of corporations, not set out either in decision or statute, but arising
from the impact on social and economic situations foreseeably resulting
from a corporate course of action. When the impact point is reached, it is
predictable that a hitherto undetermined liability or responsibility will
suddenly emerge as explicit law.
7 5
Berle explained that his initial position thirty-five years earlier had
been to allow government rather than the private corporation to
look after the public interest.76 The course of history, he observed,
provided otherwise. The corporation, as defined by the 1960's, was
responding to societal demands-at least to a limited extent.77
Berle set out at least three social responsibilities which corpora-
tions might meet. The first was to supply the markets which are
depending on them. The second was to carry on production with a
minimum of waste. The third was "to police their own operations,
[and] ascertain whether they are living up to the expectations
they create," and to "the best traditions of honorable merchants. '78
While purporting to give some recognition to societal needs,
Berle's view of the corporate mission remained parochial, for the
social responsibilities of business were limited to the commercial
and economic functions which business performs. Although he
recognized that in the future, national needs and planning will be
influential in business decisions,7 9 Berle believed corporations
should not carry the burden of remedying social problems.
Despite Berle's view, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has in recent years been used as one vehicle for encourag-
ing or even coercing corporations to help remedy social problems.
By virtue of its jurisdiction under the Securities Act of 1933,80 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,81 the SEC requires public dis-
closure of relevant investor oriented information. 82 While in the
75. Id.
76. Id. at 150-51.
77. Id. at 152:
The corporate system of our time can do whatever in reason is asked
of it in terms of production, expenditure of capital and distribution of
profit. But the corporate system cannot, should not and should not
be expected to produce a society. It can and should conform to social
requirements; it can and should lend help to government and to
quasi-public and other institutions whose task is to develop a society
both good and just. On the other hand, nothing in the structure of
corporations or in the training of their management entitles them to
be philosophers.
78. Id. at 152-53.
79. Id. at 155-56.
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77 (1976).
81. Id. §§ 78a to 78.
82. See generally H. CHERRINGTON, THE INVESTOR AND THE SEcuRrS AcTS
(1942); 1 L. Loss, SECURTES REGULATION 121-31 (1961); Cohen, "Truth in Se-
curities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L REV. 1340 (1966); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the
Role of Disclosure, 63 MCH. L REV. 607 (1964).
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past relevant--or material-information has generally been lim-
ited to matters concerning the economic well being of the issuer
and the shareholder's investment interest,83 the SEC has been en-
gaged in litigation over the past five years involving the propriety
of requiring disclosure of socially relevant activities. 84 There also
has been a good deal of scholarly debate concerning the use of dis-
closure to ensure an enhanced corporate conscience.85 In addition
to the issue whether Berle was correct in his position that corpora-
tions should not carry this burden,8  is the issue whether this ex-
tension of the purpose of the investor oriented securities acts is
the proper method for increasing corporate responsibility.87 These
questions become even more pressing in exploring the ideas of the
current proponents of increasing social responsibility by restruc-
turing the large corporate enterprise.
IV. THE NADER GROUP AND STONE: TOWARDS THE
WELFARE ORIENTED CORPORATION
The views of consumer advocates Ralph Nader, Mark Green,
and Joel Seligman88 are presented in this section along with those
of Professor Christopher Stone.89 They have all recommended ex-
tensive legislative reform packages, similar in many respects,
which are aimed at making corporations accountable to the public.
Their views would go well beyond the scheme envisioned by the
SEC.90 They find governmental and public intervention in corpo-
rate affairs, particularly corporate decisionmaking, desirable. The
differences in their proposals will be examined.
A. The Nader Group's Approach
It is not merely the size of the corporation that bothers Nader
but the power and social impact that have accompanied corporate
growth: "Herbivorous dinosaurs were also huge-but weak, dumb
and helpless before predators. Our giant firms, on the other hand,
83. See 1 L Loss, SEcURtEs REGULATION (1961).
84. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C.
1977); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689
(D.D.C. 1974).
85. See, e.g., J. SIMoN, C. PowERs & J. GUNNEMAN, THE ETHicAL INVESTOR (1972);
Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for
Disclosure on Corporate Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV. 539 (1976); Steven-
son, The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 50 (1976).
86. See note 79 supra.
87. See Hazen, supra note 4, at 408-12.
88. R. NA:ER, M. GREEN & J. SELiGMAN, supra note 29.
89. C. STONE, supra note 30.
90. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
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have both size and power."91 Enraged by corporate crime and
other abuses of power which the public thus far has been unable to
control, Nader and his associates vehemently attack the modern
corporate systems and urge extensive legislation to end all of its
dirty ways. Taming the Giant Corporation is filled with extreme
and angering examples of unscrupulous corporate behavior.92
Since these examples are not counterbalanced by ones demon-
strating exemplary corporate behavior, it is the authors' clear in-
tent that by the end of the book readers be as hostile towards the
modern corporate giant as are the authors. The legislative frame-
work for the Nader group's many reforms is to be provided by fed-
eral chartering of larger American corporations, an idea which is
far from new.93
91. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 16.
92. E.g.,
In the early 1970s... Reserve Mining Company dumped 67,000 tons
of waste rock and asbestos fibers a day into Lake Superior ....
Between 1946 and 1971, levels of pollution in many industries rose
from 200 percent to 2,000 percent .... [T]he National Cancer Insti-
tute ... estimated ... up to 90 percent of all human cancers are
caused by environmental factors, including industrial pollution.
Id. at 17-18.
When Elmer Bobst, chairman of Warner-Lambert and godfather to
Tricia Nixon, had an antitrust problem, he felt free to bypass the Jus-
tice Department. "I never opened my mouth to the President about
the case," protested Bobst, adding, however, "I did talk to other peo-
ple in the White House about it, though."
Id. at 21.
In January 1974, four editors at Wilmington's The Morning News and
The Evening Journal, both run by DuPont interests, either resigned
or were fired, the editors said that their boards of directors opposed
news stories that embarrassed or reflected adversely on the DuPont
family.
Id. at 24.
Potlatch Forests illustrated its environmental concern by a nation-
wide advertisement showing a picture of a spanking clean Clearwa-
ter River in Idaho, where Potlatch has a pulp mill, with the caption,
"It cost us a bundle, but the Clearwater still runs clear." The photo-
graph, however, had been taken many miles upstream from its pol-
luting pulp mill.
Id. at 25.
Nine major grain companies have been convicted of a conspiracy to
short-weigh--or steal from-wheat and rice shipments made by the
U.S. to foreign nations under the Food for Peace program.
Id. at 31.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has uncovered how Braniff Airways
failed to record the sale of 3,626 tickets in order to finance its illegal
campaign giving.
Id.
93. See Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49 HARv. L
REv. 396 (1936); Cary, supra note 46; Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate
Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAw. 1101 (1974); Fleisher, "Federal Corpo-
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The Nader rationale is no different from that of his predeces-
sors: Controls must be exerted 'over corporate activities. He ar-
gues that current state corporate chartering statutes9 are
inadequate for the task, and have already abdicated such responsi-
bilities.9 5 Nader and his associates are not dissuaded in their goals
by notions of increased government regulation. To the contrary, it
is their position that the powers of corporations have already
grown too large unchecked. The essence of the Nader group's new
federal rules is to subject corporate operations to public scrutiny
and to thereby prohibit deceptive and criminal activities. Rather
than fearing excessive governmental interference, Nader
welcomes regulation with open arms.
B. Stone's Approach
In contrast to the Nader group, Professor Stone approaches the
corporate social responsibility problem with the self-assuredness
of a social scientist dealing with abstract models. His intent is
equally far reaching in scope: to create a new political system.
However, rather than rely on government regulation to force the
large corporation into the proper mode, Stone attacks the problem
from the inside. The essence of the Stone proposal is a shift in the
ration Law'". An Assessment, 78 HARV. L REV. 1146 (1965); Henning, Federal
Corporate Charteringfor Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 21 DE
PAUL L. REV. 915 (1972); Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An
Introduction, 61 GEo. L.J. 71 (1972); Stevens, Uniform Corporation Laws
Through Interstate Compacts and Federal Legislation, 34 MICH. L REv. 1063
(1936); Note, Federal Chartering of Coporations: A Proposal, 61 GEo. L.J. 89
(1972).
94. See ABA-AI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1969) (a living document which is peri-
odically amended). The Model Act has to a large extent unified the various
state acts. See generally Eisenberg, The Model Business Corporation Act and
the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 29 Bus. LAW. 1407 (1974);
Folk, Corporations Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DuxE L.J. 875; Harris, The Model
Business Corporation Act-Invitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 1
(1955).
95. [T]o control national and multinational corporations requires na-
tional authority. State chartering is a costly anachronism-as logical
as the state printing of money or passports. If a criminal crosses
state borders, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is called in; if a
commodity or service travels interstate, so too, should the jurisdic-
tion of the federal government-over the structure of corporate gov-
ernance. Other than a few corporate lawyers and public officials in
Delaware, who would not be embarrassed to defend the proposition
that only a state, and not the federal government, can charter GM or
ITT? The choice, ultimately, is between federal chartering and Dela-
ware chartering.
R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 70. See also, e.g., Com-
ment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967,117 U.
PA. L. REv. 861 (1969).
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internal corporate structure as a means of affecting corporate be-
havior.96
Professor Stone fashions his proposals upon restructuring the
corporate decision-making process since "the proponents of corpo-
rate responsibility do wrong to put so much emphasis on what cor-
porations are deciding rather than on how they are deciding-the
corporate decision process itself."97 Focusing on those at the
top--directors and high management-Professor Stone urges in-
trusion not on the substance, but on the procedures and structures
of the decision making process: "Instead of treating the corpora-
tion's inner processes as a 'black box,' to be influenced only indi-
rectly through threats laid about its environment like traps, we
need more straight-forward 'intrusions' into the corporation's deci-
sion structure and processes than society has yet undertaken."98
The primary method of intrusion, and the crux of Stone's pro-
posals, is a systems approach. He would define by law the roles
and functions of directors, committees, management, divisions and
critical employees. In this manner, he argues that the public
would be assured that certain corporate personnel will tend to
specified public concerns. Under this scheme, when critical
problems arise, the government would be in a position to inject
qualified personnel into the corporate structure to resolve them.99
Structurally defined management roles and duties would also en-
able any failure to perform legislated duties to be traced to those
responsible. 00 Penalties, such as discharge or individual liability
without corporate indemnification for injuries resulting, for exam-
ple, from the failure of a manager to check the safety of a product
for public use, would be provided to insure performance of public-
oriented corporate responsibilities of manufacturing concerns.101
Professor Stone finds encouragement for his proposal in cur-
rent corporate statutes,102 and in the commerce clause, which
he sees as the constitutional authority for the enactment of his rec-
ommendations. 03 He envisions a federal legislative scheme, al-
96. Stone is not alone in this structuralist approach. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE
STRucTURE OF THE CoRPoRATIoN(1976); Coffee, supra note 30. Not surpris-
ingly, the efficacy of these proposals has been questioned. See, e.g., De Mott,
Management Structure and the Control of Corporate Information, 41 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB., Summer, 1977, at 182.
97. C. SToNE, supra note 30, at 217.
98. Id. at 121.
99. Id. at 192.
100. Id. at 124.
101. Id. at 191-92.
102. Id. at 125: "The very existence of legal requirements in this area is evidence
that the corporate world can live with some intrusions into its 'internal' or-
ganization at least in principle."
103. Id. at 144.
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though not specifically federal chartering,104 with a "Federal
Corporations Commission" to handle the tasks of enforcement, and
of proposing and revising corporate functions. 0 5
C. Nader and Stone Compared
Like the -ader group, Stone's intent is to subject corporations
to a great deal more government control and public scrutiny.
While he posits his plan as a remodeling of the corporate decision-
making process, it seems that the substance of his proposals would
not provide a significantly different result than those advocated by
the Nader group. In both instances the proposals seem to be
geared to broader based societal reform rather than to a redefini-
tion of the corporate structure and mission.
The areas of reform emphasized by the Nader group and Stone
are compared below for clarification:
Nader, Green & Seligman Stone
Board of Directors Board of Directors
Information and Disclosure Information and Disclosure
Shareholder Rights Management Rights
Employee Rights
Antitrust
The Nader group's proposals span more specific areas than do
those of Stone. But this is no indication of the relative expansive-
ness of each of their reforms. Stone focuses more closely on the
parties to the corporate decisionmaking process in an effort to
change their roles to make them responsible for many public inter-
est items beyond corporate selfishness.
L Board of Directors
It is quite clear to the authors of Taming the Giant Corporation
that directors of large corporations presently serve no valid pur-
pose.106 The chief criticism is that directors sit on boards but have
little involvement in or understanding of the companies they di-
rect. They are often mere figureheads, a reason inside manage-
ment is able to seek out sympathetic, congenial and prestigious
friends to fill the "outside" director slots.107 This is the starting
104. Id. at 71-72 n.*.
105. Id. at 144. Compare Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Stand-
ards Act, 29 Bus. LAw. 1101 (1974).
106. Nader echoes the words of William 0. Douglas to the effect that "directors do
not direct." R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 95 (quoting
Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L REV. 1305 (1934)). He also
looks to the writings of Peter Drucker who similarly observed. "[Tihere is
one thing all boards have in common, regardless of their legal position. They
do notfunction." Id. (quoting P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT 628 (1973)).
107. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 97.
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point for the Nader proposals.
The Nader group appears anxious to revitalize directors' roles.
It argues that directors must be held to high standards of public
accountability. Like the branches of government, the board should
be separate and independent from corporate management.108
Under both the Nader and Stone proposals directorships should
constitute at least part time jobs for those filling them.109 But here
the views part. The Nader group urges that the board's control
over management be enhanced, and that the board have specific
responsibilities to the public; Stone proposes an intervening sys-
tem of public directorships with specific responsibilities to the
public.
More specifically, the Nader group takes a position reminiscent
of Professor Dodd's" 0 and recommends that the board of directors
be charged with assuring that corporate executives are knowledge-
able of federal, state and local laws and that in addition, it have a
decisive reviewing power over important management decisions.
The board should have more say in day-to-day operations includ-
ing a decisive voice in the hiring and firing of key employees. Fi-
nally, it should be required to publicize the corporation's record of
abiding by the law and of protecting shareholder interests."'
In contrast, but perhaps for similar purposes, Professor Stone
goes to great lengths and specificity in developing his concept of
public directors. He suggests two categories: general public direc-
tors and special public directors. The number of general public di-
rectors to be placed on corporate boards would be determined by a
formula: ten percent of all directors for each $1 billion in sales.
Stone calculates that such a formula would place public directors
on the boards of 260 American corporations (excluding financial
corporations for which Stone provides another formula).112 The
Federal Corporations Commission would be charged with the re-
sponsibility of nominating general public directors, whom the reg-
ular directors would have the power to approve as well as
108. Similarly, Stone specifically suggests that all insiders be removed from the
board, that not more than 10 percent of the board members have a financial
interest in the corporation, and that liability for wrongdoing be increased. C.
STONE, supra note 30, at 134-51. There is voluminous literature endorsing the
concept of independent directors. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Legal Models of Man-
agement Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and
Accountants, 63 CALIF. IL RE V. 375 (1975).
109. R NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 119; C. STONE, supra
note 30, at 124, 192.
110. See text accompanying notes 61-68 supra.
111. & NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 119. Once again this is
merely an extension of the current SEC philosophy.
112. C. STONE, supra note 30, at 158.
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remove.113
Some of the duties of general public directors would include
representing public interests, conducting activities such as legal
and efficiency audits of the corporation, and serving as legislative
as well as public liaisons for the corporation." 4 Special public di-
rectors would be similar to general public directors. However,
their functions would differ slightly as they would be utilized as
trouble shooters when necessary to remedy specific corporate
problems and thus would have a temporary existence. In contrast
to the broader charge of the general public directors, special public
directors would provide the board with expertise for specific
problems. They would be granted investigatory authority, and per-
haps, sanctioning powers." 5
The Nader group disagrees with Stone's public directorship
proposal primarily because it does not guarantee that "the public
interest" will be protected." 6 The group envisions another method
by which the board of directors may protect the public interest.
This is to be achieved by assigning each director a specific area of
public responsibility." 7 Stone does not agree that the Nader
group's proposal would adequately affect the board's decisionmak-
ing. He acknowledges resistance to his public directorship alterna-
tive, but nevertheless seems satisfied with it: "[I]f the only virtue
of the general public directorship system was a symbolic one-a
more obtrusive, nagging reminder of these companies' obligations
to society than the American flag over the plants-the system
would, to my mind have justified itself."" 8 In sum, these two theo-
ries agree on the goal of a corporate conscience controlled by re-
sponsible directors, but differ on the means towards that end.
113. Id. at 159.
114. Id. at 163-65.
115. Id. at 174-83.
116. It seems impossible to design a general "interest group" formula
which will assure that all affected constituencies of large industrial
corporations will be represented and that all constituencies will be
given appropriate weight. Even if such a formula could be designed,
however, there is the danger that consumer or community or minor-
ity or franchisee representatives would become only special pleaders
for their constituents and otherwise lack the loyalty or interest to di-
rect generally... Alternatively, federally appointed public direc-
tors might be frozen out of critical decision-making by a majority of
"privately" elected directors, or the appointing agency itself might be
biased.
R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SEUGMAN, supra note 29, at 124.
117. The proponents list several such areas: employee welfare, consumer protec-
tion, environmental protection and community relations, shareholder rights,
compliance with law, finances, purchasing and marketing, management effi-
ciency, and planning and research. Id. at 125. See also, e.g., Conard, Reflec-
tions on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941 (1977).
118. C. STONE, supra note 30, at 174.
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2. Shareholder Rights
The Nader group believes that the shareholders should be
given enough authority to effectively oversee board and manage-
ment activities. 119 They should serve as a check on the corporate
system. To meet this aim, the Nader group proposes that share-
holders be given the power to nominate independent outsiders for
directorships. Additionally, the proxy machinery should be re-
vamped. Candidates for the board should be required to supply
statements to all shareholders as to their qualifications for director
positions. The costs, with certain upper limits imposed, would be
borne by the corporation.120
Better information would also enhance shareholder ability to
monitor corporate action. For example, the Nader group suggests
increased access to corporate records. 12 1 It also proposes that all
significant corporate board decisions be brought to the sharehold-
ers' attention in advance. When decisions are reached, the board
would be required to inform shareholders of the results and ration-
ale for the decisions. 122 Shareholder oversight abilities would also
be improved by assuring private rights of action under federal
law.123
Although Nader is far from alone in calling for increased share-
holder suffrage in the large public-issue company,124 this method
119. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 128-30. This is in recog-
nition of the current ineffectiveness of any shareholder voice. See, e.g., A.
BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 25; Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE LJ.-1477,
1490 (1958). See note 51 & accompanying text supra.
120. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 127-29.
121. Id. at 129-30. In addition to the wide range of information available to the
shareholders under the SEC disclosure requirements, state corporate char-
ters give a right of inspection of all relevant books and records so long as the
shareholder states a proper purpose. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 52
(1969).
See, e.g., Wood, Walker & Co. v. Evans, 461 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1972); State
ex tel. Healy v. Superior Oil Co., 40 Del. 460, 13 A.2d 453 (1940); State ex rel.
Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 4 Del. 81, 143 A. 257 (1926); Shekers, Inc. v.
Reeve, 131 Ga. App. 18, 205 S.E.2d 108 (1974); Weigel v. O'Connor, 57 Ill. App.
3d 1017, 373 N.E.2d 421 (1978); State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291
Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406 (1971).
122. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 127-29.
123. Id. at 253.
124. See, e.g., Black, Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Governance, 5 SEC
REG. L.J. 291 (1978); Caplan, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Pro-
gramfor Fair Corporate Suffrage, 39 VA. L. REv. 141 (1953); Eisenberg, Access
to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1489 (1970); Schwartz &
Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEo. LJ. 635
(1977); Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Di-
rector in the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74 COLuM. L REV. 1139 (1974); Note,
Protecting the Shareholders' Right to Inspect the Share Register in Corporate
Proxy Contests for the Election of Directors, 50 S. CAL. L, REV. 1273 (1977).
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does not seem to be either an appropriate or effective vehicle for
increasing corporate responsibility. In the first instance, the sepa-
ration of ownership from control' 25 is not only a fait accompli, it
has been suggested that it should be formally adopted as the
norm.126 Even if the shareholder vote is not eliminated entirely, 27
the practical recognition of the public issue shareholder's investor
rather than proprietary interest orientation calls for less emphasis
on increased suffrage as an effective measure. This is not to say,
however, that increased disclosure under the proxy rules should
not exist at least to the extent that it relates to the shareholder
qua investor and will indirectly affect managerial action. 28
3. Employee Rights
The Nader group is concerned that huge corporations are not
restrained, as are many less influential governmental units, by the
constitutional protections of individual rights. The "Raiders" see
more and more problems in corporate dominance of employees'
personal lives. To remedy the increasing problems, they propose
an "Employee Bill of Rights," which will guarantee protection of
some constitutionally protected rights. Specifically, the Nader
group proposes that corporations respect individual freedoms of
speech, press, religion, peaceable assembly, the right to privacy,
and the guarantee of equal protection. 29 This is one of many ex-
amples of the overreaching of this proposal.
Placing the private corporation in the position of establishing
employee rights that are already guaranteed to all citizens under
the Constitution is an unwarranted transfer of responsibility from
the public to the private sector. Under our present system corpo-
rations, like all other citizens, must respect others' individual free-
doms. To establish the separate and duplicative employee bill of
rights as advocated by Nader is not only unnecessary but inappro-
priate as well. Under the proposed scheme, the private corpora-
tion would be granted increased power which would carry with it
more legitimacy. Such an increase in power could well result in a
more corporate dominated society than we have today-the pre-
cise problem that Nader seeks to alleviate. The inevitable result
125. See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 25; text accompanying notes 25-27
supra.
126. Manning, supra note 119, at 1490; see note 51 supra.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L REV. 408
(1962); Hazen, supra note 4; Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate
the Board of Directors, 41 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB., Summer, 1977, at 63.
129. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELaGmAw, supra note 29, at 194. See also Berle,
Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity---Protection of Personal
Rights from Invasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L REV. 933 (1952).
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would be increased corporate influence in the public sector which
would create a type of big brotherism that is clearly undesirable.
4. Information and Disclosure
While both the Nader group and Professor Stone agree that the
external and internal information flows of corporations ought to be
improved, Professor John Coffee sees this as the heart of his pro-
posal.'3 0 Coffee's plan is for a more systematic series of informa-
tion networks within the corporate structure. In contrast, the
Nader plan is but an expansion of the SEC's current position
which focuses on disseminating more information to the public.
For example, it recommends sending shareholders the corpora-
tion's annual 10-K form, required by the SEC, in place of the pres-
ent annual report. It suggests the more informative but less
colorful 10-K forms should also be sent to government agencies
and libraries. 13 ' The primary aim is to require the corporation to
inform the public of the social impact of its operations (pollution
clean-up, occupational safety and health policies, employment dis-
crimination, advertising and lobbying) and of its financial proce-
dures (ownership, control, government relations, largest security
holders, executive income, and product line financial data).132 The
Nader oriented disclosure not only transcends notions of share-
holders' proprietary interests, it also goes beyond the investors' in-
terests by utilizing the corporate chartering machinery to protect
other outside interests.
In contrast to Nader, Professor Stone makes more specific
structural recommendations to improve the internal flow of corpo-
rate information.133 The question arises: Why should this be of
public concern? Stone offers the following explanation:
[T] here is, in the environment of each corporation, a great deal of informa-
tion bearing upon its own activities that it never receives. This is part of a
more general problem in the society-so often critical information is avail-
able, but simply is not being steered to the appropriate place for action.
One of the more extraordinary facts we discovered in our "autopsy" of the
MER/29 [drug] affair was that within three months of the drug's release
the chief of cardiology at Los Angeles's Cedars of Lebanon Hospital had
announced that he was discontinuing use of MER/29 because of its effects
on his patients. There is no indication as to whether, and in what form,
these doubts might have been relayed to [the manufacturer] Richardson-
Merrell, much less the FDA. But we know that E. F. Hutton, the stockbro-
kerage house, picked up the story almost immediately and alerted its bro-
kers across the nation-for it portended a possible decline in Richardson-
Merrell stock. In other words, the information processes of our society are
130. Coffee, supra note 30.
131. I. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 139.
132. Id. at 140-79. See also, e.g., Branson, supra note 85.
133. C. STONE, supra note 30, at 201-09.
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such that across America doctors were prescribing MER/29, oblivious to
dangers that their stockbrokers had long been alerted to.1 34
To prevent incidents, such as that described above, Stone suggests
that certain designated employees be charged with gathering and
disseminating certain kinds of information, and that top executives
and the board of directors be required to keep themselves in-
formed of these and other items. 35
D. A Recapitulation
Legislative solutions to problems will always be suggested, but
the costs that they entail may prevent their ever being adopted.
The proposals of the Nader group and of Professor Stone are but
the most recent examples, following a long line of predecessors. 136
Professor Stone advocates a remaking of the corporate "think-
ing" process. He hopes to make corporations behave more as indi-
viduals would, by requiring them to weigh all the consequences of
their actions. Under such a plan, there would be no guarantee that
public interests would be uniformly protected. But, Stone reme-
dies this by having a government agency regulate, and hence unify
the roles and functions of the corporate decision makers. Thus, it
appears that the federal agency in charge of enforcing Stone's leg-
islative scheme would have great power to determine the public
interests to be respected by modern corporations.
The Nader group, in contrast, recognizes the risks of assigning
public responsibilities to profit-minded corporate officers and di-
rectors. It, therefore, provides a more typical legislative scheme:
regulations and prohibitions. The Nader group attempts to change
corporate behavior, not by restructuring it, but by providing a com-
prehensive set of rules designed primarily to make corporations
report their activities to the public.
The foregoing views represent by far the most sweeping propos-
als for corporate reform. The proponents envision a structural
revolution that would be accomplished pursuant to legislative nor-
mative reform. However, it is not clear that these goals can be ac-
complished entirely through structural reform. Success along
these lines is dependent upon acceptance of an entirely new per-
spective on the corporate mission. Far beyond recognizing the
ability of private enterprise to adopt social responsibilities, the Na-
134. Id. at 201-02. See, e.g., Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966).
135. C. STONE, supra note 30, at 203-09.
136. E.g., Berry, Corporate Bigness and Diversification in Manufacturing, 28 OHio
ST. L. REV. 402 (1967); Blumberg, supra note 39; Cary, supra note 47; Deutsch,
The Responsibility of a Corporation:An Attempt at Implementation, 20 Vnj.
L. REV. 938 (1975); Dodd, supra note 27; Miller, supra note 38; Schultze, The
Public Use of Private Interes HARPER'S, May, 1977, at 43.
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der-Stone paradigm envisions the corporate entity as the guardian
of society's needs. Here lies the essential shortcoming of this view.
The proponents fail to provide any meaningful guidelines for bal-
ancing the competing interests of the profit motive and the general
welfare. An attempt to deal with both interests within the confines
of corporate chartering statutes-be they state or federal-is too
monumental a task. Contrary to Stone's and Coffee's assertions,
there is a limit to the areas which may be effectively regulated by
focusing on structural reform. For example, while such reform, in-
cluding more open information systems, can go far towards corpo-
rate efficiency and a balancing of public and private interests, it is
not an end in itself.
V. LEVITT: SEPARATING THE PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SECTORS
Professor Theodore Levitt does not advocate sweeping reforms.
His view of corporate social responsibility is more restrictive than
those heretofore presented. 13 7 According to Levitt, writing in 1958,
the whole idea of corporate social responsibilities was being taken
too seriously. It had become the vogue for businessmen to speak
out on their companies' social responsibilities. Accordingly, the
public was not only beginning to believe in the idea, but business-
men were also beginning to believe their own words.138 Professor
Levitt argued that all this "talk" should be put to rest since it could
only create an unrealistic situation. 139
Levitt had two major objections to the corporation becoming a
"great public benefactor." In the first place, it would have required
subordination of the profit motive to these loftier goals. This, Lev-
itt believed, would be difficult to accomplish. 140 In the second
place, and even more importantly, it would place corporations in
an exalted position in society; expansion of their authority would
lead to the eventual demise of the democratic system.'41 Placing
too much power in any sector be it public or private can lead to a
dictatorship. The risk in the private sector is substantially greater
137. See, e.g., Dangers, supra note 31. One gets an inkling of Levitt's feelings sim-
ply by the title of his article. His more recent book, T. LEvrrr, THE TmnD
SECTOR, NEW TACTICS FOR A RESPONSIVE SOCIETY (1973) [hereinafter cited as
THD SECToR], repeats those feelings, at the same time suggesting other
sources for resolution of society's ills.
138. Dangers, supra note 31, at 43.
139. Id. at 42. Levitt described this utopian, socially responsible corporate entity
as "a voluntary association of selfless entrepreneurs singularly dedicated to
creating munificence for one and all-an almost spiritually blissful state of
cooperative and responsible enterprise." Id.
140. Id. at 46.
141. Id. at 44.
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since there is an absence of the necessary checks and balances
against the abuse of power. Certainly, this fear seems justified in
view of the massive Nader/Stone proposals and the spectre of 1984
which they raise.
Levitt explained that "[t]he essence of free enterprise is to go
after profit in any way that is consistent with its own survival as an
economic system."'42 He saw societal benefit as a possible side ef-
fect of corporate success but not as its primary focus:
Corporate welfare makes good sense if it makes good economic sense-
and not infrequently it does. But if something does not make economic
sense, sentiment or idealism ought not let it in the door. Sentiment is a
corrupting and debilitating influence in business. It fosters leniency,
inefficiency, sluggishness, extravagance, and hardens the innovationary
arteries. It can confuse the role of the businessman just as much as the
profit motive could confuse the role of the government official. The gov-
erning rule in industry should be that something is good only if it pa.
Otherwise, it is alien and impermissible. This is the rule of capitalism. 43
Levitt thus feared that the expansion of the corporate mission
would in fact hinder the goals of the reformers since the social ob-
ligations would always take a second seat to the profit motive.
According to this view, the fallacy of the public interest corpora-
tion is that even though the idea of corporate responsibility be-
comes more prevalent, as long as business has a choice it will opt
for economic efficiencies over social needs.144 The rationale for
corporate action can always be made to conform to some powerful
public interest.145 If the profit motive underlies business behavior,
is it possible to turn corporations into socially responsible institu-
tions? Professor Levitt said yes, but only at the cost of destroying
our pluralistic democracy. He contended that broadening business
responsibilities would turn us towards a monolithic society, in
which one exalted institution ministers to all. 4 6
Society depends on the expression of all views. But, as the cor-
poration grows more powerful and dominant, it quashes opposing
142. Id. at 44.
143. Id. at 48.
144. See id. at 47-48.
145. E.g.,
when it comes to choosing between the small Arkansas supplier
whose town would be ruined if orders stopped and the Minneapolis
supplier who can make it cheaper, there is no doubt that even the
most socially responsible corporation will take the latter. It can al-
ways fall back on responsibility to its employees, stockholders, or
customers, and still pretend it is being fashionable.
Id. at 43.
146. '"e corporation would eventually invest itself with all-embracing duties, ob-
ligations, and finally powers-ministering to the whole man and molding him
and society in the image of the corporation's narrow ambitions and its essen-
tially unsocial needs." Id. at 44.
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viewpoints while representing only one determination of the pub-
lic interest. In the long-run, society would suffer because it no
longer had the freedom to express contrary viewpoints, and even if
it did, it would no longer have any power to enforce them. Thus,
Professor Levitt returned to the original complaint that had been
made against modem corporations-that they are too power-
ful-and urged readers to reconsider endeavors to make corpora-
tions more powerful by requiring them to fulfill social welfare
needs:
We all fear an omnipotent state because it creates a dull and frighten-
ing conformity-a monolithic society. We do not want a society with one
locus of power, one authority, one arbiter of propriety .... We do not
want our lives shaped by a single viewpoint or by a single way of doing
things, even if the material consequences are bountiful and the intentions
are honorable.1 4
7
Levitt recognized that society is divided into several sectors.
Private business is only one of them. There are also the sectors of
government, education and the military. Each sector is expected
to perform its particular function in society. As long as each sector
is left to perform its singular chore, a pluralistic society will exist.
Each sector will protect the interests and needs of the function for
which it is responsible. The function of government, said Levitt, is
to protect the public interest. Similarly, the function of business is
to procure profits. Leave business to business or the function of
business will overlap that of government. The resulting blur of the
distinction between the functions of government and business in
society will cause development of a partnership between the two
sectors. Then Levitt argued, there will be no guarantee for the
public that government is protecting their interests, and that busi-
ness desire for profits is not dominating government action.
According to Levitt, the risk of having private enterprise admin-
ister the public welfare is that in the end a single institution will be
providing "womb-to-tomb ministration" to its millions of depen-
dents.14 8 This would be big brother originating in the private
rather than public sector.14 9 Or, as Levitt describes it:
Even if its outlook were the purest kind of goodwill, that would not
recommend the corporation as an arbiter of our lives. What is bad for this
or any other country is for society to be consciously and aggressively
shaped by a single functional group or a single ideology, whatever it may
be.1 o
This is not to say that corporations will become villains under the
guise of private enterprise. Even if corporations are not required
147. Id.
148. Id. at 45.
149. See G. ORwELL, 1984 (1949).
150. Dangers, supra note 31, at 44-45.
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to perform socially-oriented programs, as Professor Levitt recom-
mended, there is no reason not to expect corporations, and corpo-
rate personnel "to obey the elementary canons of everyday face-to-
face civility (honesty, goodfaith, and so on) .... ,151
In his 1973 work, The Third Sector, New Tactics for a Responsive
Society, Professor Levitt stands firm in his view that business is
governed by the profit motive and ought not be engaged to protect
social interests. 52 Instead, social interests can be furthered by en-
couraging the actions of reformist groups and organizations, i.e.,
"the third sector."
Professor Levitt maintains that the problem of which young ac-
tivists complain is that the large institutions have grown insensi-
tive to individual needs and concerns:
In the past, they wanted specific reforms. Today they want a more respon-
sive society. Specifically, they want more responsive and benign behavior
on the part of the large bureaucracies-government, corporate, judicial,
professional, and educational-the big bureaucracies that make the cru-
cial decisions that affect our lives and whose combined efforts have pro-
duced in such massive abundance precisely what America has always so
undeviatingly valued....
... The real problem, they feel, is that society is in the iron grip of a
group of involuted and bovine bureaucracies, both public and private
.... Furthermore, the old machinery for conflict resolution and social
accommodation-like political participation, legislation, pressure groups,
and voluntary association-has, in the view of the new activists itself be-
come bureaucratized, sluggish, and often just plain obsolete.1 5 9
The solution is not to change the roles of various institutions in
society, but to make institutions more sensitive and more respon-
sive. The means for accomplishing this, are provided by what Pro-
fessor Levitt has termed "the third sector." These are public
interest groups, which sway public opinion, fight in Congress, and
even attack directly the gigantic and callous bureaucracies.
Levitt claims business depends on stability and certainty. It
can be made to respond to social needs only by the disruption of
these valued conditions. 15 4 In his view, corporate executives "do
more than merely talk back" once provoked by outside sources.155
151. Id. at 49.
152. THim SECTOR, supra note 137, at 3-4.
153. Id. at 3-4, 10-11.
154. The problem is how to get large bureaucracies to continue to do
their bureaucratic jobs with their accustomed narrow efficiency
while also making them quickly aware of and effectively responsive
to the social and human consequences of their actions.
Fortunately, the answer lies precisely in the nature of the bureau-
cratic organization itself. The sudden disruption of its routine is its
greatest vulnerability.
Id. at 44. See also Soderquist & Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights
and Corporate Responsibility: New Guidelines for Management, 1978 Du-:E
L.J. 819.
155. Id.
1978]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
He cites as an example the Coca Cola Company which was pub-
licly attacked in 1970 "for fostering the unseemly living conditions
of migrant workers at its orange groves.' u5 6 He asserts that public
criticism and threats to current economic security will motivate
corporations to respond most effectively to social needs. While it
might not produce the drastic results desired, some changes will
be made, and they will be made immediately.
Professor Levitt maintains that there are too many examples of
corporations paying lip service to their social obligation, while fol-
lowing the course to higher profits in making final business deci-
sions. This is certainly to be expected. In Levitt's view it is not
bad for business to follow the profit making motive. The way to
make corporations more responsive to public needs is to make it
economic for corporations to be so. This is to be accomplished not
only through the activities of the "third sector" but also through
the responsiveness of the public sector in carrying out its charge.
VI. MANNE: ONE ECONOMIST'S VIEW
In contrast to the previous views, Professor Henry Manne, in
the tradition of laissez-faire free market economists, favors the
profit motive as the sole internal as well as external factor in shap-
ing corporate conduct. 57 The essence of Manne's analysis is that
free market forces, left unregulated, will guide the corporation in
the proper direction.
Manne takes issue with Berle and Means' concern for the sepa-
ration of ownership from control in the form of management rule.
As an economist he views this separation as a positive good which
reflects the realities of the modern large corporation:
156. "[T]he company did not rush out quickly merely to putlap, say, neat new
placating mobile homes .... [Instead it] set into motion a far-ranging pro-
gram to build new housing, raise wages, and include the citrus pickers in
many of the nonwage benefits enjoyed by permanent CocaCola employees."
Id. at 46.
157. See, e.g., Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA.
I REV. 259 (1967); Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Es-
say in Honor of Adolph A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L REV. 1427 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Theoretical Aspects]; Manne, Should Corporations Assume More So-
cial Responsibilities?, in THE ATrACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA: THE CORPO-
RATE ISSUES SOunCEBOOK 3 (M. Johnson ed. 1978) (not surprisingly the
question is answered in the negative); The "Higher Criticism, " supra note 32.
Accord, Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 33. For a competing econo-
mist's view, see J.K. GALBRAH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE 11-34 (1967).
Galbraith maintains that growth rather than the maximization of profits is
the typical management goal. See generally Hetherington, Fact & Legal The-
ory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN.
L REv. 248, 258-60 (1969).
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[TJhe corporation [is] operated financially in the interest of "control"
.... Not that the "control" or the managements have become thieves;
quite the contrary. Rather, they have come to recognize (perhaps as
"business statesmen") that first claim on accumulated profits is the claim
of the enterprise itself-that, for example, the first duty of a steel company
is to make steel, and have it there in sufficient quantity to meet the ex-
isting or foreseeable future requirements of the community. These needs
take precedence over the dividend desires of any body of passive stock-
holders-as indeed they should.
1 5 8
A corollary to this view of the proper focus of management control
is the concept of a market for control. 15 9
Manne argues against significant shareholder voting rights and
stringent, externally imposed management norms since the mar-
ket operates as the arbiter. Under this view shareholders voice
their disapproval of management by selling their shares and this
increased supply drives the price of stock downward. This is seen
as one direct incentive against mismanagement. Additionally, if
the stock price drops low enough, the company becomes ripe for a
takeover which, of course, would act as further incentive for ex-
isting corporate managers to rule effectively 60 Certainly, the
stock market is a factor in controlling management.16' However,
this control market will only react to extreme mismanagement and
thus gives management far too much leeway, clearly even more
than does the judicially-created "business judgment rule" that
gives a presumption of validity to management actions.162 Accord-
ingly, the framers of our current corporate system have deter-
mined that more than market forces are necessary to keep
corporate management in tow.163
158. The "Higher Criticism,"supra note 32, at 449. Ironically, Manne's formulation
of the corporation's 'Tirst duty" sounds more akin to a social responsibility
approach than to the supremacy of the profit motive.
159. Theoretical Aspects, supra note 157, at 1430-34; The "Higher Criticism," supra
note 32, at 410.
160. The "Higher Criticism," supra note 32, at 412.
161. Manne's observations put an economist's slant on the observation that share-
holders in a public issue corporation have their interests more properly
aligned with those of an investor than those of a proprietor. See Hazen,
supra note 4. See also, e.g., J. LIviNGSTON, THE A MIcAN STOCKHOLDER 66-67
(1958).
162. See generally H. HENN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATrEiAs 587-99 (1974).
163. These controls are found first, in judicially developed standards of care and
duty of loyalty. E.g., Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Selheimer v. Man-
ganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966). But see, e.g., Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 DeL Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963). See generally eL BAL-
LANTiNE, CoRPORATnONs §§ 62-65 (rev. ed. 1946); W. CARY, CASES AND MATERi-
ALS ON COPORATrONS 573-697 (4th unabr ed. 1969); H. HENN, LAW OF
CO~ROA-nONs 450-84 (2d ed. 1970). Second, the state corporate chartering
statutes contain legislatively imposed management norms. E.g., ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CoRPu. AcT §§ 41, 48 (1969).
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Pursuant to the market approach to corporate conduct, it is
maintained that economic forces may well result in a socially re-
sponsible institution, but only to the extent that social responsibil-
ity would be in the best economic interest of the corporation-be it
short or long range.164 For example, consumer-oriented companies
may increase their public esteem by beneficent acts and thus, in
turn, may increase sales. One obvious limit to the market view of
social responsibility is that it is inapplicable to a major portion of
the private sector since many concerns do not operate in a market
that is responsive to a corporate image. Also, limiting a corpora-
tion's responsibility to such narrow parameters fails to meet an ad-
equate level of responsibility. For example, market forces would
not and did not lead automobile manufacturers to install pollution
control devices or to give adequate consideration to automobile
safety.
Another basic fallacy in this analysis is the unfounded assump-
tion that the pure economic market model is reproducible in the
real world. Additionally, Manne's economic analysis has been
questioned in terms of its failure to consider social responsibility
as a method of ensuring long-run profit maximization.165
Even beyond the theoretical problems of Manne's analysis are
the faulty examples that he provides. Manne's single is-
sue focus ignores the reality of the multidimensional impact of a
steel company upon society, including the American economy.166
For example, the environmental impact of steel production can de-
molish communities and ruin other industry. The company's rela-
tions with its employees can affect the entire economy. A steel
strike cripples several other major enterprises such as American
automobile manufacturers, not to mention construction and other
heavy industry.167 Certainly there must be some check on this
The third and perhaps most effective series of controls are found in the
federal securities laws, both in their disclosure and their antifraud provi-
sions. See generally Cary, supra note 47; Cox, Fraud Is in the Eyes of the
Beholder: Rule 10b-5"s Application to Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47
N.Y.U.L. REV. 674 (1972); Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An
Assessment, 78 HARV. L REV. 1146 (1965); Jacobs, The Role of Securities Ex-
change Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 27 (1973); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62
MICH. IL REV. 607 (1964); Schulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43
YALE L.J. 277 (1933); Simpson Investors' Civil Remedies Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 12 DE PAUL L REV. 71 (1962).
164. The "Higher Criticism," supra note 32, at 416-19.
165. Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modem Corporation, 47 Am. ECON.
REV. 311, 313-14 (1957).
166. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
167. Of course, this "ripples on the water" analysis represents an oversimplifica-
tion of the direct and collateral impact that a major public issue company can
have on society. There are numerous forces that combine to produce such
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type of corporate power, whether it be coerced corporate altru-
ism 168 or a well-reasoned system of government regulation to pro-
tect the public interest.169 Manne's reliance on "the need for a
comprehensive analysis of economic forces' 17 0 in lieu of a "rule of
law"'171 may work on the models in the economist's laboratory but
not beyond those four walls.
Another basis of Manne's attack on the socially responsible cor-
porations is his observation that "[an] important thing to note
about the economics of nonproductive expenditures is that the ul-
timate costs are apt to be borne by persons whom we would proba-
bly not choose to bear such costs."'172 Specifically, he is pointing to
the consumer or "society" as bearing the cost. At question here is
his assumption that this is not the proper basis of cost accounting.
In the first instance, since these costs will occur to offset or prevent
the otherwise adverse collateral impact of the enterprise in ques-
tion, it is fitting, at least within the confines of an economic model,
that the costs should be borne by the beneficiaries of the product
or service in question. To the extent that these costs become too
high td make the product saleable, there are two alternatives: (1)
abide by the market's determination that the costs do not outweigh
the benefits; or (2) look to either the public sector or to the 'third
sector" to ensure that the costs are further spread out in order to
bring the price down to one that the market can tolerate.
In sum, the model chosen by Professor Manne is simply the po-
lar opposite of Nader's corporate big brotherism. As is the case in
any system, the extremes provide thought provoking concepts in
theory, but do not offer much in terms of wholesale adoption.
However, much of the knowledge to be gained from both of these
extremist views reflects the types of balances which must be
struck in order to arrive at a workable paradigm.
VIL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The views presented above are intended to illustrate the wide
divergence of opinion among commentators on the subject of cor-
porate responsibility and the role of corporate law and manage-
consequences, yet this schematic prototype does represent one of the major
forces.
168. See, e.g., I. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 29; C. STONE, supra
note 30.
169. See, e.g., THnm SECTOR, supra note 137.
170. The "Higher Criticism," supra note 32, at 430.
171. Id. at 424-26.
172. Manne, Should Corporations Assume More Social Responsibilities?, in THE
ATrACK ON CORPORATE AmEmcA: THE CORPORATE ISSUES SOURCEBOOK 3, 7
(M. Johnson ed. 1978).
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ment. The striking absence of a consensus has prevented
development of a unified workable theory which might in the long
run be implemented to solve the corporate responsibility problem.
As important as the differences are the similarities that exist in
the views of Berle and Means, the Nader group, Stone and Levitt.
Several common threads do exist, and tie their views together. In
the first instance, it is generally agreed that there exists a problem
with the corporate role in society. Public demand for more respon-
sible corporate behavior is acknowledged. Secondly, the strong
and guiding force of the profit motive is recognized. While Manne
is blinded by it, Berle and Means cling to it. Levitt demands that
profit maximization dominate business goals. The Nader group
and Stone claim not to negate the profit motive, as Berle and Levitt
seem to fear. They purport to merely require that business pursue
it by paying the additional social costs incurred. Thirdly, there ap-
pears to be a concensus among Berle and Means, Nader, Stone and
Levitt that a certain minimum standard of corporate responsibility
is required. In other words, blatant corporate misconduct may and
should be prohibited. The difficulty exists, still, in how this meager
level of responsibility ought to be enforced. Fourthly, these para-
digms all express the long-standing American fear of large uncon-
trolled accumulations of power which, by contrast, Manne exalts.
The items yet in disagreement provide drawbacks, however.
Among them are, first, whether a long or short run approach ought
to be taken to make corporations more accountable. The Nader
group advocates immediate action. But it does not consider the
long term effects of increased state and public involvement in cor-
porate actions. It objects to the current partnership existing be-
tween government and business, and urges more strict
government regulation. If Levitt's predictions of the future prove
true, however, the current partnership is nothing compared to the
merger of government and business that will evolve if corporations
are forced to become truly social institutions. Indeed, this theoret-
ical disagreement must be worked out.
Second, is the discord with respect to the importance of the
profit motive as an incentive to business. The question becomes
whether it can be adequately replaced. This .is a question that
deeply concerned Berle and Means; they reluctantly approved re-
forming the corporate function in society without an equally impel-
ling incentive. Levitt, in contrast, admits of no substitute without
dissolution of our current political system.
Third, is the obvious difference of opinion as to the meaning of
corporate social responsibility. This definitional problem is so con-
siderable that Professor Stone devotes a chapter to it in Where the
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Law Ends.17 3 The trouble, he believes, is that
[t]he notion is so open-textured that people who might plausibly claim to
be "responsible" in one sense of the term could be made to appear, with
no disagreement as to the facts, "irresponsible" in another. For example,
some people undoubtedly consider Daniel Ellsberg's releasing of the Pen-
tagon Papers "irresponsible," while others, without any significant disa-
greement as to the facts or even as to a position on the Vietnam War,
could support him as a paragon of responsibility.1 7 4
The issue, then, that needs to be decided is whether corporate re-
sponsibility ought to emphasize obedience to law, or to a higher
morality. In the latter sense, responsibility would constitute fuller
consideration of the larger ramifications of corporate behavior. It
would also bring about the subordination of the profit motive, a
development to which Levitt so violently objects.
The final disagreement, once corporate responsibility is de-
fined, concerns how it should be implemented or enforced. The
current dissatisfaction with government bureaucracy and ineffi-
ciency dissuades easy acceptance of comprehensive legislative
schemes which would require creation of another government
agency. Existing structures might be used. But of course, Profes-
sor Levitt's suggestion is easiest and less costly to the government
purse, that is, to let interest groups provoke corporations' reforma-
tions of their responsibilities.
In the last analysis, whether the disagreements may be over-
come, enabling the formulation of a reasonable plan of corporate
social responsibility, is at least doubtful. It is far more likely that a
piecemeal approach to corporate abuses of power will continue to
be taken. Some day several students might engage in a study just
as Berle and Means did in the 1930's. Their conclusions just might
lead them to proclaim that the largest corporation has usurped the
powers of the state, and in fact, is governing society. To avoid such
an apocryphal result, agreement as to the proper limits of corpo-
rate responsibility must be reached.
173. C. STONE, supra note 30.
174. Id. at 113.
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